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IS IT SAFE? THE NEED FOR STATE
ETHICAL RULES TO KEEP PACE WITH
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES
Ann M. Murphy*
INTRODUCTION
As discussed at the October 5, 2012 Symposium on Federal Rule of
Evidence 502,1 the practice of law has changed dramatically in the past
decade, due in part to technological advances. With the tremendous amount
of electronically stored information, which continues to grow exponentially,
attorney duties have become increasingly difficult. Fortunately, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence have been
amended to reflect the sea change in the amount of material in cases. Rules
of professional conduct, dictated by each individual state, have not kept
pace with this change. Changes need to be made, and the sooner the better.
I. PROCEDURES AND COURT ORDERS PERMITTED UNDER RULE 502
IMPLEMENTED RELATIVELY INFREQUENTLY
The purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 502, according to the Senate
Judiciary Committee, was to update privilege law to address the increasing
costs of court cases and the burden on attorneys to produce only
nonprotected material in the electronic age.2 The Senate bill that included
the language of Rule 502 “attracted widespread support from major legal
organizations representing stakeholders on all sides of modern litigation.”3
During the Symposium, judges, attorneys, and academics met to discuss
and determine the effectiveness of the new rule. Apparently the Rule thus
far has not been widely effective.

* Professor of Law, Gonzaga University School of Law. Professor Murphy expresses her
gratitude to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence for its
invitation to participate with eminent legal minds on this Rule 502 Symposium. Special
thanks to Reed Professor of Law Daniel J. Capra. Additional thanks to Professor Kevin
Michels for his valuable insight, to Research Assistant Molly Rose Fehringer, J.D. class of
2013, and to Gonzaga University School of Law. The title is a reference to a memorable
scene from Marathon Man in which Laurence Olivier, playing a former Nazi SS war
criminal, tortures Dustin Hoffman with a dental drill all the while asking, “Is it safe?” See
MARATHON MAN (Paramount Pictures 1976).
1. Symposium, Evidence Rules Committee: Symposium on Rule 502, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1533 (2013).
2. S. REP. NO. 110-264, at 1–3 (2008).
3. Id. at 3.
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The consensus among the Symposium participants was that Rule 502 is
not being used to its full potential. As indicated by the panelists, there are a
number of reasons for this, not the least of which is that many attorneys are
not aware of its existence.4 Another reason is what was described at the
Symposium as attorney “skepticism, cynicism, and suspicion,” and the
“inbred reluctance” of attorneys to turn over privileged documents to the
other party in a court case.5 Certainly, the Rule contemplates a whole new
way of doing business. As panelist Chilton Varner indicated, this is a
difficult leap of faith to make because lawyers have been trained and
“brought up to believe that waiving a privilege was one of the—maybe the
worst thing you could do as a lawyer.”6
Perhaps there is a very good reason for this “inbred reluctance.”
Remember that all lawyers are also bound by their separate state rules of
ethics, and Rule 502 does not on its face change or affect lawyers’ ethical
obligations. Rule 502 contemplates advertent waiver, inadvertent waiver,
agreement of the parties (clawbacks and quick peeks), and court orders with
respect to the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. It is a
rule of evidence, and neither it nor Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Duty to Disclose) governs or forgives an attorney’s ethical duty
of confidentiality. This is essentially a case of apples and oranges. In fact,
“some commentators have suggested that inadvertent disclosure through a
misdirected e-mail would almost certainly constitute a breach of legal
ethics, or grounds for malpractice.”7
II. IS ADVERTENT OR INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE
UNDER RULE 502 UNETHICAL?
During the Symposium, U.S. District Court Judge Paul Grimm spoke
about three areas of disagreement that percolate in the courts when
interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 502, one of which is the definition of
“inadvertent.”8 Judge Grimm described how a series of courts had gone
through a “multiple-step analysis to include reasonableness to decide if it
was inadvertent, and then said it was inadvertent, and then got to the next
step under 502(b), which was, was it reasonable?”9 He indicated that this
“conjoining” of reasonableness in both the pre- and post-production
analysis in order to determine whether the disclosure is inadvertent showed
that some courts had gone “off track.”10 Fortunately, according to Judge
4. Panel Discussion, Reinvigorating Rule 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1533, 1548 (2013).
5. Id. at 1551, 1555.
6. Id. at 1555.
7. Mitchel L. Winick, Brian Burris & Y. Danae Bush, Playing I Spy with Client
Confidences: Confidentiality, Privilege and Electronic Communications, 31 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1225, 1255 (2000).
8. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 1544–47.
9. Id. at 1545.
10. Id.; see also Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter,
Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Has It Lived Up to Its Potential?, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8
(2011).
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Grimm, some courts have reached a consensus so that today there is a
“common majority view” that inadvertence means essentially a “booboo”—in other words a mistake.11 He cited specifically to the Amobi v.
D.C. Department of Corrections12 case, decided by another panelist at the
Symposium, U.S. Magistrate Judge John Facciola.13
In Amobi, a corrections officer, Stephen Amobi, was placed on
administrative leave, arrested, removed from his position, and ultimately
reinstated, after an altercation with an inmate.14 In his memorandum
opinion, Judge Facciola decided five discovery disputes, one of which
involved an alleged inadvertent disclosure of protected information.15 At
issue was Rule 502(b), which states the following:
Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a
federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a
federal or state proceeding if:
(1) the disclosure is inadvertent;
(2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to
prevent disclosure; and
(3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error,
including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(5)(B).16

Judge Facciola indicated that case law prior to the Rule was divided on
how to define “inadvertent.”17 On the one hand, some courts looked at a
number of factors, such as the number of documents involved in a case, the
level of care exercised, and how the party reacted after learning of the
disclosure.18 On the other hand, different courts “have found that Rule
502(b) provides for a more simple analysis of considering if the party
intended to produce a privileged document or if the production was a
mistake.”19 Judge Facciola decided to follow the latter approach, persuaded
by the goals of the drafting committee (citing to a letter from U.S. District
Court Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, also a panelist at the Symposium), as well as
the ordinary definition of the word inadvertent.20 He declared that any
other approach would “meld two concepts,” inadvertence and reasonable
efforts, and that those two concepts should in fact be distinct.21
11. Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 1545.
12. 262 F.R.D. 45 (D.D.C. 2009).
13. See id.
14. Amobi v. District of Columbia, No. BEL 08-1501, 2012 WL 3217589, at *1–2
(D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2012); Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 48.
15. See Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 48.
16. FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
17. Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 53.
18. Id.; see, e.g., Heriot v. Byrne, 257 F.R.D. 645 (N.D. Ill. 2009). Although Judge
Facciola indicates in Amobi that this case was decided “prior to the Rule,” Amobi, 262
F.R.D. at 53, it was actually decided after the passage of Rule 502.
19. Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 53; see, e.g., Coburn Grp., LLC v. Whitecap Advisors LLC,
640 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1037–38 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (cited specifically by Judge Facciola).
20. Amobi, 262 F.R.D. at 53.
21. Id.
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Finally, Judge Facciola decided that inadvertent meant mistaken or
unintended disclosure, without any analysis of whether the mistaken or
unintended disclosure was reasonable.22 On this point, Judges Grimm and
Facciola agree. Indeed, a plain reading of the Rule (and it was passed by
Congress and thus should be read as a statute) is fully consistent with their
view. Part (b) of the Rule has three separate components: inadvertence,
reasonable steps to prevent, and reasonable steps to rectify. One hopes that
the standard view of courts today is that inadvertence indeed means
mistake, pure and simple.23
But this understanding raises a problem an attorney may face in a
different aspect of his or her representation of a client away from the
discovery and trial evidence trenches. Has the lawyer, by making a
“mistake,” engaged in unethical behavior or even malpractice? This Essay
explores this question.
III. COMPARISON OF ETHICAL DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY, ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE, AND WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE
Before this question can be explored, a basic understanding of the ethical
duty of confidentiality, the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney workproduct doctrine is required.24 Although related and based on similar
policy concerns,25 the attorney-client privilege, the work-product-protection
doctrine, and the ethical rule of confidentiality are three distinct legal
concepts—each is derived from a different authority, serves a different
purpose, and has a different effect on the conduct of lawyers. Part III
briefly summarizes each concept and explains the differences between
them.
The duty of confidentiality is set forth in the American Bar Association’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct at Rule 1.6.26 Although the Model
Rules serve as a national model for state ethical rules they “are not selfexecuting and carry no independent authority—ultimately a lawyer’s ethical
obligations are determined by the laws (or rules) of the state (or states) in
which the lawyer is licensed to practice.”27 Every state, with the exception

22. Id.
23. Certainly since Congress passed the Rule, courts have taken dramatically different
views of the requirements. See Grimm et al., supra note 10; Ann M. Murphy, Federal Rule
of Evidence 502: The “Get Out of Jail Free” Provision—or Is It?, 41 N.M. L. REV. 193
(2011).
24. See generally 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 9.5, at 9-19 (3d ed. 2001) (noting the “continuing confusion” in the legal
profession regarding the difference between these concepts).
25. Id. § 9.5, at 9-17 (“Professional-ethical rules of confidentiality (like Model Rule 1.6)
are closely related to the evidentiary rule of attorney-client privilege and are animated by
similar policy concerns.”).
26. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).
27. Debra L. Bassett, E-Pitfalls: Ethics and E-discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 449, 451
(2009).
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of California, has adopted the format of the American Bar Association
(ABA) Model Rules, although many states have made changes to them.28
The ethical rule of confidentiality is extraordinarily broad.29 Model Rule
1.6 provides the following: “(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed
consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).”30
Accordingly, the confidentiality rule prohibits the attorney from revealing
any information about the representation of a client and is not restricted to
legal advice and communication, as is the case with the attorney-client
privilege. “The confidentiality rule . . . applies not only to matters
communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information
relating to the representation, whatever its source.”31
By contrast, the attorney-client privilege is an evidentiary rule. Dean
John Henry Wigmore, one of the foremost experts on evidence, defined the
attorney-client privilege in the following way:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.32

28. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_
rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Feb.
15, 2013) (the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands have also adopted the format
of the Model Rules). In a significant move that will be discussed below, the ABA recently
adopted amendments to the Model Rules that are referred to as the “Technology
Amendments.” See infra notes 77–87 and accompanying text.
The Technology
Amendments to the Model Rules were adopted on August 6, 2012, and are reflected in 105A
and 105B. See AM. BAR ASS’N ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RESOLUTION
105A REVISED (Aug. 2012) [hereinafter RESOLUTION 105A REVISED], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120802_revised
_resolution_105a.authcheckdam.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES: RESOLUTION 105B (Aug. 2012) [hereinafter RESOLUTION 105B], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_
meeting_105b_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf. The press release of the ABA is
available at: ABA Adopts Policy on Ethics in the Profession, Criminal Justice Reforms, and
Civil Standards in Immigration Detention, AM. BAR ASS’N (Aug. 7, 2012), http://
www.abanow.org/2012/08/aba-adopts-policy-on-ethics-in-the-profession-criminal-justicereforms-and-civil-standards-in-immigration-detention/.
29. See Edward W. Feldman, Be Careful What You Reveal: Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.6, LITIGATION, Summer/Fall 2012, at 33; Jamila Johnson, Pillow Talk: The
Obligations of RPC 1.6, WASH. ST. BAR NEWS, Nov. 2012, at 11, available at http://
www.wsba.org/News-and-Events/Publications-Newsletters-Brochures/~/media/Files/News_
Events/Publications/Bar%20News/2012%20Full%20Issues/201211NovemberBarNews.ashx.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2012).
31. Id. cmt. 3.
32. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554
(1961); see also Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of
Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 855 (1998).
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To illustrate the difference between the two concepts, consider a situation
where a client seeks legal advice and also business or tax advice from the
lawyer. The confidentiality rule prohibits the attorney from revealing any
of this information (including actions taken by the attorney or client
concerning this business and/or tax advice), but the attorney-client privilege
would protect only the legal advice and only actual communication between
the lawyer and the client. “[T]he ethical rule of confidentiality is more
protective than the attorney-client privilege, because the latter protects only
against compelled disclosure, and only against disclosure of information
communicated between client and lawyer.”33 Underlying facts are not
protected by the attorney-client privilege.34
Rule 502 also applies to the work-product doctrine. The work product
doctrine as we know it today originated from the U.S. Supreme Court
opinion in Hickman v. Taylor.35 In Hickman, attorneys for a deceased
tugboat crewmember sought the tugboat owner’s attorney’s notes of
interviews with survivors of the accident.36 The Supreme Court determined
that the legal profession would be “demoraliz[ed]” if attorneys were forced
to turn over information they gathered, as well as their thoughts and
theories about the case that they prepared in anticipation of litigation.37 The
concepts of Hickman were incorporated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) Rule 26(b)(3).38
The work-product doctrine is, on the one hand, narrower than the
attorney-client privilege because it is a procedural rule, but, on the other
hand, is broader than the attorney-client privilege because it applies to more
than simply communication between the attorney and client. The attorneyclient privilege is nearly absolute in its application and has only a few
narrow exceptions, and if the material consists of the attorney’s thoughts,
mental impressions, and theories, the work product protection is also
virtually absolute.39 However, if the material does not contain the
attorney’s mental processes it is not protected to the same degree.40 Under
either the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, the above
scenario would not be protected. It would, however be protected under the
duty of confidentiality.

33. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, § 9.2, at 9-17.
34. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981).
35. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
36. Id. at 498–99.
37. Id. at 511.
38. Steven Allison, Mandana Massoumi & Kate Santon, Ethical Issues for In-House
Counsel: Attorney-Client Privilege, Confidentiality, Work Product Doctrine and Conflicts of
Interest, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (2010), http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/Santon_
Ethical_Issues_InHouse_Counsel.pdf.
39. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508. This is referred to as “opinion work product.” See
Grimm et al., supra note 10, at 14.
40. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508. This is referred to as “ordinary work product.” See
Grimm et al., supra note 10, at 14.
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Lay persons, as well as attorneys and judges, frequently confound the
doctrines. Due to the confusion, it may be helpful to consider these
concepts side by side. Below is a table of comparison.
Ethical Duty of
Confidentiality
Attorney shall not
reveal information
“relating to the
representation” of a
client unless the client
gives informed consent
or revealing the
information is
impliedly authorized to
carry out
representation (or
permitted by
exceptions).

Attorney-Client
Privilege
Attorney not
compelled to reveal
communication
relating to legal
advice rendered to a
client if made in
confidence; privilege
may be waived and is
subject to limited
exceptions.
Formal legal
proceedings held in
response to an
attempt to compel
testimony.41

Work Product
Protection
No discovery allowed
of documents and
tangible things prepared
by an attorney if they are
prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial.
May be discovered if
(1) they are otherwise
discoverable; and
(2) the party shows
substantial need and is
unable to obtain them
without undue hardship.
However, the court must
protect against disclosure
of mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of the
attorney.

It is clear that the three concepts are intertwined but different. As
mentioned above, the ethical duty of confidentiality applies to attorneys
who are licensed to practice law, and this duty is dictated by the attorney’s
particular state bar association (although nearly every state follows the
Model Rules). The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence and
originates from common law. The work-product protection is governed by
FRCP 26. Any change to the Federal Rules of Evidence (such as the
addition of Rule 502) will not affect the individual state ethical rules. In
fact, these rules address very different concerns. It is true that “the parallel
law in the civil litigation context does not merely supplement or
complement rules of professional conduct; it is increasingly in tension with
the ethics rules, causing several problems.”42
Rule 502 applies to both the attorney-client privilege and the workproduct doctrine.43 The impetus for Rule 502 was the exponential growth

41. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, § 9.5, at 9-20.
42. Andrew Perlman, The Parallel Law of Lawyering in Civil Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1965, 1965 (2011).
43. See Grimm et al., supra note 10, at 3 (the Rule does not apply to the “vast array” of
other privileges).
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in electronically-stored information (ESI).44 It is estimated that “well over
90% of all information is now created and stored electronically.”45 Both
the 2006 e-discovery amendments to the FRCP and the addition of Federal
Rule of Evidence 502 addressed the challenges raised by ESI.46 When it
comes to the ethical rules of confidentiality, however, very little has been
done to answer the questions raised by the use of ESI. In fact, “many states
have no rules governing ESI,”47 and some states’ ethical rules of
confidentiality do not mention inadvertent disclosure at all.48 Inadvertent
disclosure is generally mentioned if a state follows Model Rule 4.4(b),
which governs the attorney who receives inadvertently disclosed material
from another attorney.49 The Rule does not focus on the attorney who
inadvertently discloses the information.
A greater number of attorneys will necessarily be affected by individual
state laws because state caseloads (taken together) are larger than the
federal caseload.50 Unfortunately, state ethical rules do not, by and large,
address the difficulties attorneys face with the increasing proliferation of
ESI. For example, “Model Rule 1.6—the Confidentiality of Information
rule—does not address two emerging confidentiality issues, which include
confidential information in metadata and the disclosure of confidential
information pursuant to a clawback or quick-peek agreement or order (as
contemplated by the new federal rules).”51 A wonderful resource on
guidelines for state practices is the Conference of Chief Justices, Guidelines
for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery of Electronically-Stored
Information, but this contains guidelines for trials and discovery and is not
aimed at, nor does it mention, state ethical rules.52
IV. THE ETHICAL DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
The duty of confidentiality has been included in rules and interpreted by
the American Bar Association for many years. It was included in Canon 37

44. See Jessica Wang, Comment, Nonwaiver Agreements After Federal Rule of Evidence
502: A Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1845
(2009).
45. Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, E-discovery Today: The Fault Lies Not In Our Rules
. . . , 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 131, 134 (2011).
46. Id. at 134–35.
47. Id. at 148.
48. Paula Schaefer, The Future of Inadvertent Disclosure: The Lingering Need To
Revise Professional Conduct Rules, 69 MD. L. REV. 195, 241 (2010).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2012) provides the following: “A
lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and
knows or reasonably should know that the document was inadvertently sent shall promptly
notify the sender.” Id.
50. See Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 45, at 17.
51. Schaefer, supra note 48, at 196.
52. Conference of Chief Justices, Guidelines for State Trial Courts Regarding Discovery
of Electronically-Stored Information, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. (Aug. 2006), http://
www.ncsconline.org/images/EDiscCCJGuidelinesFinal.pdf.
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of the 1908 Ethical Canons.53 In 1969, the duty was included in Canon 4 of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).54 In 1983, the ABA
Again, the duty of
replaced the Code with the Model Rules.55
confidentiality was included.
As mentioned previously, the Model Rules carry no independent
authority, but instead serve as a guide that individual states may and have
used and adopted to a great degree. With the passage of the Model Rules,
the duty of confidentiality became much stronger than it was under the
Code.56 In fact, according to experts, “read literally and in isolation, the
rule is so stringent as to approach the unworkable and the unrealistic.”57 It
includes even information that is “generally known.”58 For example, in In
re Bryan,59 the court determined that the duty of confidentiality is “not
nullified by the fact that the circumstances to be disclosed are part of a
public record, or that there are other available sources for such information,
or by the fact that the lawyer received the same information from other
sources.”60 In their treatise, The Law of Lawyering, three experts urge a
more commonsense reading of the Model Rule, one that is aligned with the
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers (Restatement), which they
argue is a better approach.61 The Restatement prevents the lawyer from
disclosing information “relating to” a client only in the event it is not
generally known, for example, if it is known only through special
knowledge or acquired with substantial difficulty or expense.62 The
Restatement, produced by the American Law Institute, is not binding
authority for courts.63 The Model Rules, the opinions of experts, and the
Restatement have no binding authority on individual states.
The ethical rule of confidentiality applies even if there is no harm to the
client.64 This is one of the “remarkable omissions” from the earlier

53. Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the Law of
Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles To Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 EMORY
L.J. 1255, 1310 (1999).
54. This provision was DR 4-101(C). Id. at 1310–11; see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT preface, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_
professional_conduct_preface.html.
55. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface.
56. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, § 9.15, at 9-65.
57. Id.
58. See id.; Feldman, supra note 29; Johnson, supra note 29, at 12.
59. 61 P.3d 641 (Kan. 2003).
60. Id. at 657 (quoting NCK Org. Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976)).
61. Id. These experts are Trustee Professor of Law Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Professor
Emeritus of Law W. William Hodes, and attorney Peter R. Jarvis, authors of the two-volume
treatise The Law of Lawyering. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24.
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 cmt. d (2000); see
also Feldman, supra note 29, at 33.
63. See In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc. Inv. Litig., No. 10-4194, 2012 WL
3740685, at *7 (6th Cir. Aug. 29, 2012).
64. See State Bar of Nev., Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 41 (2009), available at http://nvbar.org/sites/default/files/opinion_41.pdf.
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provisions of the duty to the current ABA version.65 At the very least, it
applies when no harm is obvious.66 “When the duty of confidentiality does
apply, it is treated seriously in the law of lawyering. Its breach is
enforceable by civil remedies as well as through the disciplinary process.”67
One commentator said the following of the friction between the ethical duty
of confidentiality and Rule 502: “Violation of this duty constitutes cause
for disbarment or suspension of the attorney’s license to practice. It also
may give rise to civil liability for legal malpractice, breach of confidence or
other similar tort. Unless, of course, Rule 502(d) preempts state law in each
of these areas.”68
Just as with the attorney-client privilege, the duty of confidentiality does
provide for exceptions to the obligation to maintain information in
confidence.69 There are six exceptions, one of which is “to comply with
other law or a court order.”70 This may be extremely helpful in the Rule
502 arena. Certainly a Rule 502(d) order is binding on the parties;
however, it protects only in the instance of disclosure of attorney-client
privileged information and documents protected under the work-product
doctrine. Any other information that is disclosed and happens to be within
the realm of any other recognized privilege as well as all nonprivileged
material has no protection from a claim by a client or a state ethical board
regarding a confidentiality violation.71
A. Model Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information: Exception (6)—
Other Law or Court Order
During the Symposium, the panelists consistently mentioned the
effectiveness of Rule 502(d), if used by the parties.72 In fact, both
Professor Capra and this author expressed the belief that it may be an
ethical violation not to take advantage of a Rule 502(d) order.73 For
illustrative purposes, consider a situation in which a large corporation (for
instance Adidas Corporation) sues another large corporation (imagine Nike
Corporation) for trademark infringement.
The potential documents
involved number in the millions, and the amount at issue is relatively small.
The attorneys for both sides could take advantage of Rule 502(d) and obtain
a court order to the effect that neither side waives any attorney-client
65. Id. at 2. The three “remarkable omissions” are (1) the information need not be
confidential, it applies to all information; (2) the information need not be “adverse” to the
client; and (3) the duty applies even if the information is generally known or public. Id.
66. See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, § 9.15, at 9-68.
67. Id.
68. Henry S. Noyes, Federal Rule of Evidence 502: Stirring the State Law of Privilege
and Professional Responsibility with a Federal Stick, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 673, 745
(2009).
69. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1)–(6) (2012). Note that California
does not recognize many of these exceptions. See Allison et al., supra note 38, at 4.
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6).
71. Noyes, supra note 68, at 747.
72. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 1544, 1556, 1586.
73. Id. at 1582.
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privilege or work-product protection in disclosing documents. If the
attorney for Nike inadvertently discloses a document protected under the
attorney-client privilege, has he or she violated ethical rules? Given the
number of documents, it could arguably be more of an ethical violation for
the attorney to fail to cooperate with the other party and seek a court order.
One could make a theoretical argument that this exception applies more
to a situation in which a court is acting on its own initiative (Rule 502(d)),74
rather than one in which the parties reach an agreement and then seek a
court’s blessing (Rule 502(e)—if incorporated into a court order). On the
other hand, a court order is a court order, and the facts behind or procedures
by which that order came about are irrelevant. Certainly an attorney will be
entitled to more protection from an ethical violation or a malpractice claim
if he or she acts in accordance with a court order rather than simply by
reaching agreement with the other party in a case. There is a specific
exception to the duty of confidentiality if an attorney is acting pursuant to a
court order, and attorneys are well-advised to obtain one when relying on
Rule 502. This offers protection if the attorney makes a “mistake” or a
“boo-boo.” Of course, one needs to be cognizant that the order only
protects attorney-client privileged and work-product-protected information.
A more prudent approach for the attorney is to disclose fully all relevant
information to the client and obtain the client’s “informed consent” under
Model Rule 1.6(a). In so doing, the attorney is protected from a claim of a
violation of the duty of confidentiality. Of course there must be a full
disclosure: “[I]nformed consent . . . requires the attorney to fully and
effectively explain to the client the risks and consequences of disclosing
privileged and protected information.”75 This may be easier said than done,
as some of the Symposium panelists expressed, particularly if the client is
an in-house lawyer for a firm.76
B. Technology Amendments to the ABA Model Rules
In August 2012, the ABA House of Delegates approved “Technology
Amendments” that were proposed by the ABA Commission on Ethics
20/20, formed in 2009.77 The Commission was appointed to “study the
impact of technology and globalization on the legal profession.”78 The
74. “In other words, when a lawyer is faced with the choice of violating . . . a court
order, or breaching confidentiality, the lawyer is permitted—but not required—to sacrifice
confidentiality.” 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 24, § 9.12, at 9-8 to 9-9.
75. Noyes, supra note 68, at 745.
76. See Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 1551–52, 1554, 1569.
77. See RESOLUTION 105A REVISED, supra note 28; RESOLUTION 105B, supra note 28;
JOHN M. BARKETT, JUDITH A. MILLER & SETH A. ROW, TECHNOLOGY AMENDMENTS TO THE
MODEL RULES: ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS YOU SHOULD BE ASKING (Am. Bar Ass’n
Section of Litig. Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility & Ctr. for Prof’l Dev. MP3, rec. Oct. 2,
2012) (on file with author).
78. Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyers Have Duty To Stay Current on Technology’s Risks
and Benefits, New Model Ethics Comment Says, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2012, 1:46 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_have_duty_to_stay_current_on_technology
s_risks_and_benefits.
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Commission concluded that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct must
“keep pace with social change and the evolution of law practice.”79
Specifically, it noted that technology has changed the profession and altered
the practice of law in fundamental ways, and attorneys must understand that
technology so as to provide competent and cost-effective service.80
Although these amendments may strike fear in the hearts of many attorneys,
those who take advantage of, or plan to take advantage of, Rule 502 should
take comfort, as will be shown below.
Arguably the most onerous new provision of the Technology
Amendments is the change to Comment 6 to Rule 1.1 Competence, which
now reads as follows: “To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a
lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including
the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in
continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal
education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”81
In other words, lawyers are no longer allowed to be Luddites. In reality,
Comment 6 does not impose any obligations on an attorney other than those
of the earlier incarnation of the Model Rule. It simply reminds lawyers to
“remain aware of technology.”82
The Technology Amendments also added Model Rule 1.6(c), which
provides the following: “A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent
the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to,
information relating to the representation of a client.”83 At first blush, this
may seem entirely contrary to Rule 502, but the key word here is
“reasonable.” This is reiterated in Comment 18 to the Rule, which states
that an attorney has not breached this duty if “the lawyer has made
reasonable efforts to prevent the access or disclosure.”84
In reality, this addition to the Model Rules corresponds perfectly to Rule
502(b), which provides that the disclosure does not operate as a waiver if it
is inadvertent, the holder of the privilege took reasonable steps to prevent
disclosure, and the holder of the privilege took reasonable steps to rectify
the error. Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b)(2) is essentially the same as
new Model Rule 1.6(c). Of course, this is of no consequence if a particular
state has not adopted the provisions of new Model Rule 1.6(c), and, thus
far, no state has done so. In the area of ESI, ethical implications and

79. ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW (Aug. 2012),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2012
0508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdution_and_overview_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
80. Id. at 3.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (2012); see also RESOLUTION 105A
REVISED, supra note 28, at 3 (emphasis added to indicate Technology Amendment change).
82. AM. BAR ASS’N ET AL., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RESOLUTION 105A, 3
(Aug. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf.
83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c).
84. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 18.
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professional liability are problematic.85 The Restatement is helpful, but
again, it is not binding in any state.86 The provisions of the Restatement are
strikingly similar to the provisions of Rule 502(b), and are the following:
Waiver does not result if the client or other disclosing person took
precautions reasonable in the circumstances to guard against such
disclosure. What is reasonable depends on circumstances, including: the
relative importance of the communication (the more sensitive the
communication, the greater the necessary protective measures); the
efficacy of precautions taken and of additional precautions that might
have been taken; whether there were externally imposed pressures of time
or in the volume of required disclosure; whether disclosure was by act of
the client or lawyer or by a third person; and the degree of disclosure to
nonprivileged persons.87

In another similar provision to Rule 502(b), the Restatement also states that
prompt and reasonable steps must be taken to recover the communication.
It is important to note that the above discussion concerns Rule 502(b). It
is another situation entirely when the parties rely on Rule 502(a)—an
intentional waiver of the privilege, as well as (e)—a party agreement on
disclosure. Neither Model Rule 1.6 nor the Comments to Rule 1.6 address
clawback or quick-peek agreements.88 In fact, no provision was made for
these situations, despite Professor Paula Schaefer’s suggestion to the
members of the Commission.89 Even the Sedona Principles acknowledge
that clawback agreements could pose problems for state ethical purposes:
[I]t is possible that questions could arise as to whether voluntarily
entering into a ‘clawback’ production could constitute a violation of
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 . . . or Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.6 . . . if the manner of the production results in
later waivers of privileges and protections.90

No protection is provided either, as discussed previously, when an attorney
relies on a privilege or protection other than the attorney-client privilege
and work-product protection. Professor Schaefer recommends that if
85. See Thomas Y. Allman, E-discovery in Federal and State Courts: The Impact of the
2006 Federal Amendments, HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP, 76 (June 14, 2012),
http://blog.hinshawlaw.com/practicalediscovery/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/2012FedStateE
DiscoveryRulesJune14.pdf; Charles H. Gardner & Much Shelist, P.C., Electronically Stored
Information, Social Media and the Rules of Professional Conduct: Are You Compliant With
Your Duties of Competence and Diligence?, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/electronically-stored-information-social-media-andrules-professional-conduct-are-yo.
86. The Restatement is “persuasive secondary authority.” A. v. B., 726 A.2d 924, 928
(N.J. 1999).
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 79 cmt. h (2000).
88. See ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, supra note 79.
89. Letter from Paula Schaefer, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Tenn. Coll. of Law,
to Members of the ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 (July 5, 2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20110714_technol
ogyandconfidentiality_comments_all.authcheckdam.pdf.
90. Adjoa Linzy, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Discovery of Electronically-Stored
Information, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, ¶ 42 n.83.
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attorneys use either Rule 502(d) or (e), they obtain client consent before
doing so.91 She states, “Because the current Confidentiality of Information
rule requires counsel to protect client confidences unless informed consent
is given by the client to do otherwise, an attorney should not enter a
Privilege Disclosure Agreement or seek a related Order without that
consent.”92
A different situation is presented if a judge enters a 502(d) order sua
sponte or in the absence of a party agreement.93 Presumably, if a client
does not agree to disclosure, a quick-peek agreement, or a clawback
agreement, his or her attorney may object to a sua sponte order, but of
course must follow it.94 Should this happen, the attorney should be
protected from any ethical violation claim due to the exception in Model
Rule 1.6 for following a court order.95
It is refreshing that commentators in some states have mentioned the
Technology Amendments. In a recent Minnesota Legal Ethics Update,
William J. Wernz, who authored a treatise on the Minnesota ethical rules,
describes new Rule 1.6(c) and advises that “Minnesota should adopt a
counterpart.”96 The Utah Bar describes the Technology Amendments as
“significant changes,” and warns that “technophobic lawyers can no longer
ignore computers and other emerging technologies.”97 Likewise, an issue
of Wisconsin Lawyer mentions the Ethics 20/20 Commission as well as a
new proposed (as of the publication of that issue) Rule 1.6(c).98 Its author
indicates that “several states” have addressed technology issues, although
he does not address inadvertent disclosure in particular.99 In a District of
Columbia Bar publication, an author mentions the new Technology
Amendments, stating the following:
Although Bar Counsel cannot speculate as to how any of the specific
changes put forth by the ABA might one day be reflected in our own
Rules of Professional Conduct, we, like anyone else, can observe that

91. Schaefer, supra note 48, at 237.
92. Id.
93. See Noyes, supra note 68, at 746; Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 1570–71.
94. See Schaefer, supra note 48, at 237 n.212.
95. See id.
96. William Wernz, October 2012—Minnesota Ethics Update, MINN. LAWYERING (Oct.
1, 2012), http://minnesotalawyering.com/2012/10/october-2012-minnesota-ethics-update/.
Mr. Wernz is the author of MINNESOTA LEGAL ETHICS: A TREATISE (3d ed. 2012).
97. Keith A. Call, Changes May Be Coming to the RPC—or Are They Already Here?,
UTAH BAR J. (Nov. 12, 2012), http://webster.utahbar.org/barjournal/2012/11/changes_may_
be_coming_to_the_r.html.
98. Nerino Petro, Jr., The Ethics of Cloud-Based Services, WIS. LAW. (Sept. 2012),
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin_Lawyer&template=/CM/Con
tentDisplay.cfm&contentid=113469.
99. Id.
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these changes reflect new realities. And as realities change, so, too, must
the lawyer.100

According to the eDiscovery Times, “the influence of changes to the Model
Rules cannot be overstated. Most states usually adopt some variety of
changes made to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”101
C. States Have Addressed Technological Advances, to a Limited Degree
In 2002, the Model Rules were amended to add Model Rule 4.4(b),
which provides the following: “A lawyer who receives a document or
electronically stored information relating to the representation of the
lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or
electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly
notify the sender.”
At least “[t]hirty-two states have adopted Model Rule 4.4(b) or a
substantially similar provision.”102 This rule of course addresses the
recipient of the ESI, not the sender. The sender’s duty continues to be
governed by the confidentiality rule.
State bar associations have also addressed issues related to storage,
privacy of client information while using email and other transmission
vehicles, and “cloud computing.”103 A number of states have addressed the
issue of both sending and receiving metadata.104
One state ethics opinion that has received significant attention is State
Bar of California Formal Opinion 2010-179.105 The question presented
concerned the duties of an associate in a law firm who brought his workissued computer to a coffee shop and his home and used the computer at
these locations.106 At the coffee shop, he used a public wireless Internet
connection, and at home he used his own personal wireless system.107 The
California State Bar acknowledged that ethical guidance to attorneys has
100. Joe Perry, A Recommitment to Education for Newer and Experienced, D.C. BAR
(Oct. 2012), http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/
october_2012/barcounsel.cfm.
101. Charles Skamser, The Legal Profession Found the Twenty-First Century: Ignorance
Is Bliss No More, EDISCOVERY TIMES (Aug. 12, 2012), http://ediscoverytimes.com/the-legalprofession-found-the-twenty-first-century-ignorance-is-bliss-no-longer/.
102. Michael Z. Green, Preserving Attorney Client and Work Product Privilege Via EMail: Merging Federal Evidence Rule 502 with Discovery and Ethics Rules, AM. BAR
ASS’N, 9 (Nov. 5, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
labor_law/meetings/2011/ac2011/050.authcheckdam.pdf.
103. For an excellent resource listing some of the states which have addressed these
issues, see JOHN M. BARKETT ET AL., ETHICAL CHALLENGES ON THE HORIZON:
CONFIDENTIALITY, COMPETENCE AND CLOUD COMPUTING (Ctr. for Prof’l Dev. & Ctr. for
Prof’l Responsibility MP3, rec. July 24, 2012) (on file with author).
104. Metadata is essentially the history and contest of ESI—the “DNA” of ESI. See Carl
G. Roberts, The 2006 Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, AM.
BAR ASS’N (Aug. 2006), http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/tch08061.shtml.
105. State Bar of Cal., Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.
2010-179 (2010).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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not kept pace with technology.108 Although California does not follow the
ABA Model Rules (and in fact the California duty of confidentiality does
not contain an exception for disclosures impliedly authorized to carry out
the representation of the client), the California Standing Committee on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct recognized that information must
in fact be transmitted.109 It listed a number of factors for an attorney to
consider when transmitting information, and specifically indicated that the
attorney should take steps to strip metadata from any confidential
communication.110 The Committee stated the following:
Many attorneys, as with a large contingent of the general public, do not
possess much, if any, technological savvy. Although the Committee does
not believe that attorneys must develop a mastery of the security features
and deficiencies of each technology available, the duties of confidentiality
and competence that attorneys owe to their clients do require a basic
understanding of the electronic protections afforded by the technology
they use in their practice.111

The Bar Associations for Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania,
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin have addressed metadata but have
not specifically (with the exceptions of Arizona and the District of
Columbia) addressed inadvertent disclosure of client information.112
Arizona and the District of Columbia have addressed the inadvertent
disclosure of client information and both have concluded that the attorney
must take “reasonable precautions.”113 In addition, the State Bar of
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2. Note that the State Bar of California and the California Supreme Court are
considering a major restructuring of the state’s ethics rules. The State Bar recommends that
the Rules of Professional Conduct be replaced with sixty-seven new rules based upon the
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Renee Choy
Ohlendorf, California May Get New Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA LITIG. NEWS
(Sept. 21, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/092111california-ethics-model-rules-of-professional-conduct.html.
110. Id. at 4, n.11.
111. Id. at 5.
112. See J.T. Westermeier, Recent Ethics Opinion on Metadata Support Best Practice,
2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3791 (LEXIS); Ethics Comm. of the Colo. Bar Ass’n, Formal Ethics
Op. 119 (2008), available at http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/386/subID/23789/CETH//;
D.C. Bar Ass’n, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 341 (2007), available at http://www.dcbar.org/
for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/opinions/opinion341.cfm; Pa. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2009100 (2009), available at http://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/newsletters/2009/pdfs/f2009100.pdf; Vt. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. 2009-1 (2009), available at http://
www.vtbar.org/UserFiles/Files/WebPages/Attorney%20Resources/aeopinions/Advisory%20
Ethics%20Opinions/Electronic%20Documents/09-01.pdf; Wash. State Bar Ass’n, Rules of
Prof’l Conduct Comm., Op. 2216 (2012), available at http://mcle.mywsba.org/IO/print
.aspx?ID=1664; Wis. State Bar Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. EF-12-01 (2012), available at
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin_ethics_opinions&TEMPLAT
E=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=113148.
113. See State Bar of Ariz., Op. 07-03 (2007), available at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/
EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=695; State Bar of Ariz., Op. 05-04 (2005), available
at http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=523; D.C. Bar Ass’n
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Massachusetts has issued an ethics opinion on internet-based storage
systems such as Google Docs.114 One lawyer for a company that provides
e-discovery services foresees that use of predictive coding will become an
ethical obligation.115 Recently, U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew J. Peck
endorsed the use of predictive coding (computer-assisted review),116 and his
decision was adopted by U.S. District Court Judge Andrew L. Carter.117
V. PATH FOR THE FUTURE
It is interesting to note that at least one major study revealed that
technology-assisted review may be more effective than “eyes-on” manual
review of ESI.118 The extraordinary amount of information available has
made e-discovery extremely expensive. In a 2009 ABA survey on civil
practice, 82 percent of those responding indicated that “discovery is too
expensive.”119 A recent study reported that “as much as 75 to 90 percent of
additional costs attributable to e-discovery are due to increases in attorney
billings for ‘eyes-on’ review of electronic documents.”120 The use of Rule
502 is estimated to reduce the costs of this review by 80 percent.121
Unfortunately, “ethics rules have diverged from the law governing lawyers
in civil litigation in the context of inadvertently disclosed privileged
documents.”122 One commentator has even stated that “when the
applicable parallel law is in tension with the Model Rules because of a
substantive disagreement and the Model Rule does not serve any
disciplinary function, the Model Rule should be deleted.”123 The burden of
e-discovery in view of the changes in technology is simply too great given
the current model.124 Bar associations must be cognizant of the rapid-paced
changes in technology and update their rules as necessary. The process
may begin with provisions similar to FRCP 26 and Rule 502, as was

Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/
legal_ethics/opinions/opinion256.cfm.
114. See Mass. Bar Ass’n, Op. 12-03 (2012), available at http://www.massbar.org/
publications/ethics-opinions/2010-2019/2012/opinion-12-03.
115. Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer for E-discovery Company Predicts Predictive Coding
Will Become an Ethical Obligation, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 6, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer_for_e-discovery_company_predicts_predictive_coding.
116. Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 607412
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012).
117. Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11 Civ. 1279 (ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 1446534
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012).
118. Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in Ediscovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review,
17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2011).
119. Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 45, at 15.
120. Id. at 36.
121. Id. at 38.
122. Perlman, supra note 42, at 1973.
123. Id. at 1976.
124. Anthony Francis Bruno, Note, Preserving Attorney-Client Privilege in the Age of
Electronic Discovery, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 541 (2009/10).
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recently done in North Carolina.125 If the procedure and evidence rules are
in place, perhaps changes will be made to ethical rules, as happened at the
federal level. Coordination between states would be ideal, and a dialogue at
the Conference of Chief Justices would be optimal. At present, even a
minor inadvertent disclosure is treated in most states as a violation of the
duty of confidentiality, as it is a mistake, or a “boo-boo.”
CONCLUSION
As discussed at the Symposium on Federal Rule of Evidence 502, the
Rule is not being used to its potential. Certainly this is due to a number of
factors. The threat of an ethical violation or malpractice will slow the use
of the Rule. Only the states are able to act on the ethical rules, and they
should do so as quickly as possible. The states, with few exceptions, have
been slow to adopt changes to the ethical rules to address changes in
technology. Generally, if a change has been made, it has been reactive, not
proactive. Given the explosion of ESI, states do not have the luxury of
waiting any longer. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence
apply to discovery and trial. Attorneys need to be protected in all aspects of
their professional life. The duty of confidentiality is exceptionally broad
and attorneys must be free to effectively represent their clients, even in the
event of a mistake or “boo-boo” in their use of ESI.

125. North Carolina House Bill 380 has been signed by the Governor. See House Bill
380/S.L. 2011-199, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/Bill
LookUp.pl?Session=2011&BillID=H380 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). The text of the bill is
available at 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 827. See Brian C. Vick & Neil C. Magnuson, The
Promise of a Cooperative and Proportional Discovery Process in North Carolina: House
Bill 380 and the New State Electronic Discovery Rules, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 233 (2012).

